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ABSTRACT 
The present essay is the second in a series of four papers in 
which we examine the political economy of armaments in recent 
decades. In this paper we focus on the 'armament core' of large 
military producers which recently emerged as a powerful bloc 
within the big economy of the United States. The rise of this 
core was heightened by a gradual shift of large civilian 
companies toward armament business. We argue that the decline of 
large U.S.-based corporations in civilian world markets since the 
late 1960s was both a stimulus and a partial consequence to their 
increasing involvement with better investment opportunities in 
government-related activity, especially military production. The 
increasing significance of international developments inhibits 
the earlier effectiveness of the U.S. qovernment in assistinq 
corporations based in the United States with its own military 
spend i nq . 
RESUME 
Cet article est le second d'une sPrie de quatre dont le b11t eat 
d'examiner 1'Pconomie politique des armements. Cet article porte 
sur le "noyau armement" des qrands producteurs d4Pquipements 
militaires qui constituent un bloc puissant au sein de l'econonlle 
des Etats-Unis. L'essor de ce noyau se trouve renforcC par le 
glissement graduel des arandes entreprises civiles vers la 
production d'armements. Le dbclin des arandes entreprises 
amkricaines sur les rr~archCs internationaux civiis depuis la fin 
des annees 1960 consti tue h la fois un stimulus et ltne 
consbquence partielle de l1int&r2t croissant que ces entreprises 
accordent aux occasions de placement, plus intCressantes. dans 
les activitPs relevant de ltEtat, notamment dans le domaine de la 
production d'armes. L'importance croissante que revstent 
certains d8veloppements internationaux inhibe l'eff~cacite avec 
laquelle le gouvernement amCricain venait naquPre en aide dux 
entreprises basbes aux Etats-Unis, par le b ~ s i s  de ses propres 
dbpenses militaires. 
Mil i tary  involvement by the  U .S. government i n  Vietnam ended in  t h e  
e a r l y  1970s. One f a c t o r  i n  the  witMrawal may, as suggested by Kalecki 
(1967), have been the  pressure exerted by 'civilian, '  corporate i n t e r e s t s  in  
the  U.S. p o l i t i c a l  process.  However, such e f f e c t i v e  pressure  ( t o  the  ex ten t  
t h a t  it occurred) should not be exaggerated. In p a r t i c u l a r ,  it should not  be 
perceived as a sign of the  r e l a t i v e  supremacy of these  i n t e r e s t s  among 
corporate groups. During the  course of t h e  Vietnam c o n f l i c t ,  m i l i t a r y  
procurement became an i n t e g r a l  aspect  of the  U.S. economy -- one t o  be 
sought by both ' o ld '  and 'new' l a rge  corporate groups, r a t h e r  than being 
r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a narrow preserve of l imi ted  incidence. Since the  end of the  
c o n f l i c t ,  we have seen a p e r s i s t e n t  s h i f t  of the  e n t i r e  big' economy ( t h a t  
i s ,  the  c o l l e c t i v e  of very large  U.S. corpora t ions)  away from p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
in  c i v i l i a n  production and toward p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in  a c t i v i t i e s  associa ted  
with mi l i t a ry ,  space and atomic-energy p r i o r i t i e s . 1  This  s h i f t  reduces the  
value t h a t  can be at tached t o  Kalecki ' s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' o l d '  and 'new' 
business groups within the  s t r u c t u r e  of the  U.S. r u l i n g  c l a s s . 2  A s  an 
increasing number of l a rge  ' o ld '  U.S.corporat ions redi rec ted  t h e i r  focus of 
a c t i v i t y  and bought i n t o  the  'new' high-technology f i e l d s ,  the  dichotomies 
between c i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  production and between ' o l d '  and 'new' groups 
decl ined i n  relevance. Instead the re  arose a press ing  need t o  i d e n t i f y  an 
armament core, which is composed of the  most important arms producers, and 
t o  c l a r i f y  the  economic s igni f icance  of t h i s  core f o r  the  evolut ion of the  
United S t a t e s ,  e spec ia l ly  in  the  l i g h t  of suggest ions t h a t  the  U.S. economy 
has experienced a dec l ine .  
During t h e  f i s c a l  year 1986, the  U.S. Department of Defense committed 
$146 b i l l i o n  t o  prime con t rac t  awards ( t h a t  is, t o  individual  c o n t r a c t s  
exceeding $25,000 in va lue) .  About 68 per  cent  of t h i s  aggregate sum went t o  
t h e  100 l a r g e s t  'Defense con t rac to r s '  'so it was unevenly spread throughout 
t h e  U.S. economy. Members of the  group of 100 con t rac to r s  can be put  i n t o  
th ree  convenient ca tegor ies .  The f i r s t  group c o n s i s t s  of the  15-20 l a r g e s t  
Pentagon supp l i e r s  and can be termed the  'armament c o r e ' ,  while t h e  
remainder form two groups which can be c o l l e c t i v e l y  i d e n t i f i e d  by the  name 
of 'armament b e l t ' .  We can then d i s t i n g u i s h  between those con t rac to r s  i n  t h e  
armament b e l t  t h a t  a r e  g i a n t  corporat ions f o r  which Defense c o n t r a c t s  
cont r ibute  a r e l a t i v e l y  modest p a r t  of t h e i r  ove ra l l  s a l e s  revenue (such as 
AT&T, IBM, ITI', Eastman Kodak, Ford, Chrysler ,  &on, Mobil and Texaco) and 
o ther  smaller con t rac to r s ,  a l s o  i n  the  armament b e l t ,  t h a t  r e l y  more heavi ly  
on income from the  m i l i t a r y ,  space and atomic p r i o r i t i e s  f o r  Defense 
spending (such a s  Singer ,  Teledyne, E-Systems, Loral ,  FMC, Harsco and 
Gencorp). Clear ly  t h i s  three-way p a r t i t i o n  is somewhat crude and sub jec t ive .  
Note t h a t  it does no t  recognize the  impact of subcontract ing,  which may be 
s i g n i f i c a n t ,  and it ignores con t rac t s  awarded by NASA and the  Atomic Energy 
Commission a s  well  a s  foreign m i l i t a r y  s a l e s .  Furthermore, the  p a r t i t i o n  
ignores the  production of intermediate goods f o r  subsequent supply t o  the  
prime con t rac to r s .3  Despite these  f laws,  however, t h e  simple p a r t i t i o n  is 
adequate a s  a means of ident i fy ing the  most important arms producers in  t h e  
United S t a t e s .  
Choice of the  boundary between the  armament core and the  armament b e l t  
is a r b i t r a r y  t o  some ex ten t  -- t he re  is a t e n t a t i v e  ' t w i l i g h t  zone' of about 
10 corporat ions,  those ranked from 15th t o  25th on t h e  list of prime 
con t rac to r s ,  who cannot be c l e a r l y  c l a s s i f i e d  on e i t h e r  s i d e  of t h e  d iv id ing  
f r o n t i e r .  Given the  a t tendant  uncer ta in ty  and ambiguity, we concentrate our 
empirical  evidence on awards t o  the  l a r g e s t  10 Defense con t rac to r s  ( t h e  
' top-10 ' ) .  In 1986, when ordered by the  value of t h e i r  prime c o n t r a c t s ,  
t hese  con t rac to r s  were General Dynamics, General E l e c t r i c ,  McDonnell 
Douglas, Rockwell In te rna t iona l ,  General Motors, Lockheed, Raytheon, Boeing, 
United Technologies, and Grumman. With the  exception of General Motors, t h e  
composition of t h i s  list has hardly changed s ince  the  middle of t h e  1960s. 
General Motors acquired Hughes Ai rc ra f t  i n  1985 t o  re-enter  t h e  top-10 list 
a f t e r  some years  of absence from t h a t  list -- s o  it is sometimes convenient 
f o r  h i s t o r i c a l  comparisons t o  focus a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  'armament n i n e ' ,  t h e  
usual  top-10 prime con t rac to r s  with General Motors and o the r  t r a n s i t o r y  
members of the  top-10 excluded.* I n  1986, the  top-10 con t rac to r s  received 35 
per  cen t  of the  value of a l l  prime-contract awards, the  next 5 c o n t r a c t o r s  
by rank received about 7 per  cent  and the  following 5 con t rac to r s  by rank 
received l e s s  than 5 per  c e n t .  
- as a In  1967, Kalecki predicted the  r i s e  of 'p redatory '  bus iness  group, 
dominant element within the  U.S. business community. We can a s s e s s  whether 
the  r e l a t i v e  pos i t ion  of the  armament core ( a s  r ep resen ta t ive  of such 
predatory groups) has s u b s t a n t i a l l y  changed s ince  Kalecki made h i s  
predic t ion  by comparing some aggregate s t a t i s t i c s  f o r  n e t  p r o f i t s  over t h e  
subsequent per iod .  I t  seems appropr ia te  t o  consider  t h e  sha re  of the  
armament core in  the  n e t  income of the  ' b ig '  economy, provided the  l a t t e r  
can be s u i t a b l y  measured. Here we use  t h e  d a t a  provided by Fortune magazine 
f o r  the  500 l a r g e s t  i n d u s t r i a l  corporat ions t o  ind ica te  the  s i z e  of n e t  
income f o r  t h e  b i g  economy and we use d a t a  f o r  the  armament n ine  as prox ies  
f o r  n e t  income of the  armament co re .5  These d a t a  y i e l d  the  r a t i o s  of 
r e l a t i v e  n e t  income t h a t  a r e  charted in  Figure 1 f o r  t h e  period extending 
from 1966 t o  1986 inc lus ive .  The impression of changing fo r tunes  t h a t  
emerges from t h i s  f i g u r e  supports  Kalecki ' s  p red ic t ion .  The r a t i o  f e l l  from 
3 . 4  per  cent  in 1967, when spending on the  Vietnam War was c l o s e  t o  its 
peak, t o  j u s t  2 . 2  per  cent  in  1969 before rebounding in  t h e  fol lowing year  
and then r i s i n g  more o r  less continuously t h e r e a f t e r .  By 1985, the  r a t i o  had 
reached 8 . 2  per  c e n t . 6  The conclusion t o  be drawn from t h i s  evidence is t h a t  
t h e  s igni f icance  of the  armament core within the  U.S. economy has r i s e n  
dramatical ly s i n c e  about 1970 a s  the  core appropriated an increas ing s h a r e  
of the  b i g  economy's n e t  income.' Further  support f o r  t h i s  conclusion is 
a l s o  provided by d a t a  from the  I n t e r n a l  Revenue Service ,  which revea l s  t h a t  
the  share  of the  armament core  i n  aggregate corporate ne t  p r o f i t s  rose  from 
1 . 1  per  cent  in 1969 t o  3 .4  per  cent  i n  1983.8 
The growth of armament-related business s ince  the  end of the  1960s is 
in t imate ly  r e l a t ed  t o  the  o v e r a l l  dec l ine  in performance of the  U.S. economy 
r e l a t i v e  t o  performance in c e r t a i n  o ther  i n d u s t r i a l  coun t r i e s  dur ing  t h i s  
per iod .  Some evidence of changing for tunes  f o r  the  U.S. economy is revealed 
THE ARMAMENT NINE AND THE BIG ECONOMY: 
THE SHARE OF THE ARMAMENT NINE= 
IN NET PROFITS EARNED BY ALL FORTUNE-500 CORPORATIONS 
Eij I 
66 6b $8 69 7b 1 2  A 14 75 7b i 8  7b d0 dl 82 d3 lb d5 sf! 
Year 
SOURCE: Net p r o f i t  d a t a  f o r  the  Armament Nine a r e  from Standard & Poor ' s  
Compustat Services (1986) I n d u s t r i a l  Compustat, Cornpustat II/130- 
Item Annual Magnetic Tape ( f o r  1966-1985); 'The Fortune 500 ' ,  
Fortune, April  27, 1987 ( f o r  1986). 
Net p r o f i t s  of Fortune-500 corporat ions a r e  from U.S. Bureau of 
the  Census, S t a t i s t i c a l  Abs t rac t  of t h e  United S t a t e s ,  various 
years .  (These da ta  a r e  based on t h e  annual 'Fortune 500' l i s t i n g  
in  Fortune magazine. ) 
a The Armament Nine corporat ions are Boeing, General Dynamics, General 
E l e c t r i c ,  Grumman, Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas, Raytheon, Rockwell 
In te rna t iona l  and United Technologies. 
by the  values of a few macroeconomic ind ica to r s  t h a t  a r e  reproduced in Table 
1. During the  1950s and e a r l y  1960s, the  United S t a t e s  remained in  essence a 
predominantly closed economy, as i l l u s t r a t e d  by t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  low values  
f o r  expor ts  and imports in comparison t o  t h e  U.S. g r o s s  na t iona l  product .  
Exports as a sha re  of GNP, f o r  example, rose  only slowly from an annual 
average of 5.3 per  cent  in the  period 1951-5 t o  6 per  cen t  in  1961-5. Since 
the  share  of imports remained meanwhile at about 4 . 5  per  c e n t ,  t h e  t r a d e  
su rp lus  of the  United S t a t e s  grew u n t i l  t h e  e a r l y  1960s. 
Since the  late 1960s, much more in teg ra t ion  in the  world economy has 
occurred with imports s t a r t i n g  t o  grow f a s t e r  than expor ts  and with an 
a t tendant  shrinkage of the  U.S. t r ade  su rp lus  as a proportion of GNP -- an 
annual average of 1 . 4  per  cent  in  1961-5 moving t o  one of 0.7 per  cent  in  
1976-80. Continuation of t h i s  process of change i n  the  1980s saw ( i )  imports 
still r i s i n g  while the  r a t i o  of expor ts  t o  GNP f e l l ;  ( i i )  emergence of a 
t rade  d e f i c i t  t h a t  w a s  2 .4  per  cent  of the  GNP by 1986; and ( i i i )  a dramatic 
and p e r s i s t e n t  dec l ine  in the  U.S. sha re  of world exports  from an annual 
average of 19.4 per  cent  in 1951-5 t o  one of 12 .2  per  cent  in  1981-5, and 
then t o  a new low l e v e l  of 10 .9  per cent  in 1986. 
Much of the  r e l a t i v e  dec l ine  of the  United S t a t e s  can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  
developments in  o ther  developed count ies  such as Japan, West Germany and 
France. The combined share  of world exports  enjoyed by these  t h r e e  
coun t r i e s ,  f o r  example, rose  from an annual average of 13 .2  per cent  i n  
1951-5 t o  one of 25.6 per  cent  in  1971-5, and then s t a b i l i z e d  t h e r e a f t e r  a t  
about 25 per c e n t .  (See the f i n a l  column of Table 1 . )  Furthermore, the  o i l  
THE 'DECLINE OF THE UNITED STATES' 
(annual averages) 
SOURCE: The sha res  of U.S. export ,  import and t r ade  su rp lus  in the  GNP are 
calcula ted  from Ci t ibase ,  Cit ibank Economic Database [Machine-Readable 
Magnetic Data F i l e ,  19861 (New York: Ci t ibank,  N.A. 1978), p .  X-4-1, 
Table 4.1, s e r i e s  GEX and GIM, and p .  X-1-1 Table 1.1, s e r i e s  GNP. 
Period 
1951-55 
1956-60 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
1986 
The sha res  of the  U.S. and of West Germany, Japan and France in  world 
exports  are calcula ted  from In te rna t iona l  Monetary Fund, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Financia l  S t a t i s t i c s  Yearbook, 1979, p .  62; 1983, p.  72; 1986, p .  114- 
115 and In te rna t iona l  Financia l  S t a t i s t i c s ,  Vol. XLI, No. 6 ,  June, 
1988, p .  74. 
Share of GHP (%) 
U.S. W o r t  
5.3 
5.7 
6.0 
6.3 
8.4 
10.8 
10.7 
8.9 
Share of World Export ( X )  
U.S. 
19.4 
18.2 
16.8 
15.8 
13.2 
11.9 
12.2 
10.9 
U.S. Import 
4.5 
4.7 
4.6 
5.5 
7.4 
10.2 
11.1 
11.3 
West Germany 
Japan, France 
13.2 
16.8 
20.3 
23.3 
25.6 
24.7 
24.5 
28.7 
U.S. Trade 
Surplus 
0.8 
1.0 
1.4 
0.8 
1.0 
0.7 
-0.4 
-2.4 
c r i s e s  of the  1970s permitted the  oi l-export ing coun t r i e s  t o  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  
increase t h e i r  sha re  of world expor t s .9  F ina l ly ,  some third-world coun t r i e s ,  
such a s  Korea, made s i g n i f i c a n t  inroads i n  markets f o r  both consumer and 
investment g o d s .  
These macroeconomic ind ica to r s  must be in te rp re ted  with caut ion .  The 
evident  p i c t u r e  of a decl in ing U.S. pos i t ion ,  charac ter ized  by losses  in 
export  markets and by growing v u l n e r a b i l i t y  t o  foreign imports,  is c l e a r l y  
contingent  on the  assumption of a macroeconomic perspect ive  with t h e  
individual  country as its bas ic  a n a l y t i c a l  component. This  approach ignores 
the  multinational character  of la rge  modern corpora t ions .  Inspection of the  
corporat ions in the  Fortune-500 list suggests  t h a t  most of them have fore ign 
s u b s i d i a r i e s  while the  l a rge r  companies operate branch a c t i v i t i e s  in nea r ly  
every non-communist country. Production by the  foreign s u b s i d i a r i e s  is no t  
t r ea ted  as a pecu l i a r  form of expor ts  and is excluded from GNP es t imates  f o r  
the  United S t a t e s  (except f o r  fore ign earnings remitted t o  U.S. parent  
f i r m s ) .  Nevertheless, the  foreign a c t i v i t y  is of g r e a t  s ign i f i cance  t o  t h e  
parent  companies based in  the  United S t a t e s ,  a s  revealed by t h e  e n t r i e s  in  
Table 2 .  In  the  period of 1951-5, U.S.-based corporat ions received about 11 
per cent  of t h e i r  n e t  p r o f i t s  from fore ign operat ions but  the  corresponding 
value f o r  1981-5 almost t r i p l e d  t o  near ly  30 per  cen t .  
Magdoff (1967) pointed t o  the  s ign i f i cance  of fore ign earnings in  h i s  
examination of U.S. imperialism. During the  1960s, when the  United S t a t e s  
conducted an aggressive foreign pol icy ,  ac tua l  l e v e l s  of expor ts  and foreign 
investment by U.S. corporat ions were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  la rge  t o  be considered 
NET PROFITS OF U.S.-BASED CORPORATIONS 
(annual averages) 
SOURCE : Calculated from Citibase, Citibank Economic Database [Machine- 
Readable Magnetic Data F i l e ,  19861 (New York: Cit ibank,  N.A. 
1978), p .  X-6-9, Table 6.21BJ s e r i e s  GAA, GABRWN and GABRWP. 
a Excluding payments of dividends t o  foreigners and share of fore igners  in 
reinvested earnings . 
b Consists of rece ip t s  by a l l  U.S. res idents  of dividends from t h e i r  
incorporated foreign a f f i l i a t e s  and earning of unincorporated foreign 
a f f i l i a t e s ,  net  of corresponding outflows. 
Foreign 
Prof its as 
a % of Total 
P r o f i t s  
11.3 
13.2 
14.1  
15 .1  
21.3 
22.4 
29.6 
Per id 
1951-55 
1956-60 
1961-65 
1966-70 
1971-75 
1976-80 
1981-85 
N e t p r o f i t s  ( $mi l l i on )  
Totala 
21,764 
26, i02 
34 , 597 
45,980 
69,218 
135,145 
124,101 
From Foreign 
Operationsb 
2,443 
3,423 
4,810 
6,837 
14,964 
30,759 
36,613 
t he  cause of t h i s  po l i cy .  Commentaries on the  prevalent  s i t u a t i o n  cont ras ted  
it with the  case ,  argued e a r l i e r  by Hobson, f o r  the  B r i t i s h  Empire. They 
noted the  low l e v e l s  of exports  and fore ign investment, i n s i s t e d  t h a t  t h e  
United S t a t e s  was operat ing as an autarchy, and concluded the  country could 
not  be termed i m p e r i a l i s t i c  a t  the  same time. To t h e  cont rary ,  Magdoff 
argued t h i s  conclusion stemmed from a common misconception of the  r i s i n g  
'new imperialism'.  H i s  arguments had two s t r a n d s  -- one a t  the  macroeconomic 
l e v e l  and the  o ther  a t  a more disaggregated l e v e l .  
A t  t he  f i r s t  l e v e l ,  Magdoff noted t h e  United S t a t e s  was becoming 
dependent on imported raw mate r i a l s  in genera l  and on imports of s t r a t e g i c  
raw mater ia ls  i n  p a r t i c u l a r .  Also, while l e v e l s  of expor ts  and fore ign 
investment were indeed small by t h e  standards t h a t  had prevai led  f o r  t h e  
B r i t i s h  Empire i n  the  19th century,  he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the  fore ign opera t ions  
of U.S.-based mul t ina t ional  corporat ions were not  small r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  
aggregate s c a l e  of domestic a c t i v i t y .  Small flows of fore ign investment had 
accumulated i n t o  a s i g n i f i c a n t  l e v e l  of outstanding fore ign a s s e t s .  
Furthermore, foreign s a l e s  were growing a t  a much f a s t e r  r a t e  than both 
domestic s a l e s  and exports ,  while foreign s a l e s  generated an increas ing 
share  of corporate p r o f i t s .  A t  the  second l e v e l ,  t he  dependency on fore ign 
markets was more s t r i k i n g .  In 1957, only 163 corporat ions accounted f o r  
about 80 percent  of U.S. d i r e c t  investment abroad. These corpora t ions  were 
a l s o  the  l a rges t  use r s  of imported raw mater ia ls  and t h e  l a r g e s t  expor ters  
so  the  v i t a l i t y  of t h e i r  business w a s  c r u c i a l l y  a f fec ted  by U.S. foreign 
pol icy .  Magdoff suggests  t h a t  the  imperative of the  U.S. governments in 
formulating t h e i r  fore ign pol icy  was t o  maintain and expand ' f r e e  markets '  
f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  of t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  c o l l e c t i o n  of corpora t ions .  
The e n t r i e s  of Table 2 i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  evolut ion of dependency over t h e  
35 year period from 1951 t o  1985. P r o f i t s  from fore ign opera t ions  grew 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f t e r  t h e  e a r l y  1960s but  Magdoff's perspect ive  of a U.S. 
hegemony has l imi ted  v a l i d i t y  f o r  the  last two decades, p r i n c i p a l l y  because 
a s i m i l a r  g loba l i za t ion  w a s  experienced by non-U.S. companies.lo During t h i s  
recent  period,  foreign-based f i rms (pr imar i ly  opera t ing  from West Germany, 
Japan, t h e  Netherlands, France, t h e  United Kingdom and Switzerland) 
continuously challenged t h e  primacy of t h e i r  U.S. counterpar ts  both in t h e i r  
own base regions and in  the  world a t  l a rge .  One development of s p e c i a l  
s ign i f i cance  was the  penet ra t ion  by t h e  foreign-based corpora t ions  and 
inves to r s  i n t o  U.S. domestic markets. In 1970, U.S. d i r e c t  investment abroad 
amounted t o  $78 b i l l i o n ,  an amount six times larger than t h e  $13 b i l l i o n  of 
d i r e c t  foreign investment in t h e  United S t a t e s .  By 1986, U.S. d i r e c t  
investment abroad reached $259 b i l l i o n ,  but  t h i s  f i g u r e  was not  m c h  l a r g e r  
than the  d i r e c t  holding of fo re igners  in  t h e  United S t a t e s  which reached 
$209 b i l l i o n  in the  same year .11  Clea r ly ,  we have experienced a dramatic 
change in the  economic environment with the  changing fo r tunes  of the  United 
S t a t e s  as its focus.  
While they were los ing ground in  c i v i l i a n  markets both a t  home and 
abroad, U.S.-based corporat ions found the  world economy l e s s  hospi table  and 
t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  were adversely a f fec ted  by e f f e c t i v e  competition. The 
response of many l a rge  corporat ions,  a f t e r  t h e  late 1970s, was t o  r e d i r e c t  
t h e i r  p r i o r i t i e s  toward p r o j e c t s  involving armaments, space, atomic energy, 
medical equipment and f inance.  They sought out  a reas  which were more 
dependent on t h e  expenditures of governments and focused l e s s  of t h e i r  
i n i t i a t i v e  on the  demands of c i v i l i a n  consumers. Alongside t h i s  r e d i r e c t i o n  
of a c t i v i t y ,  the  corporat ions embarked on s t r u c t u r a l  adjustments through 
mergers and acqu i s i t ions ,  which markedly increased t h e  degree of 
concentration in t h e  U.S. economy. This  process of t ransformation,  involving 
both a b i a s  toward m i l i t a r y  spending and concentrat ion,  can be i l l u s t r a t e d  
by h i s t o r i c a l  developments in  t h e  automobile, aerospace, and e l e c t r o n i c s  
indus t r i e s  . 
The U.S. automobile industry contained about 200 producers in  t h e  e a r l y  
p a r t  of the  present  century .  By the  1970s, the  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of producers had 
shrunk t o  leave an ol igopoly of General Motors, Ford, Chrysler and American 
Motors i n  command of the  indust ry .  These dominant producers were 
indisputably the  world leaders  u n t i l  the  onset  of the  o i l  c r i s i s  in 1973 
i n i t i a t e d  a pronounced shock t o  t h e i r  market pos i t ion .  Wide p r o f i t  margins 
in  e a r l i e r  years  had discouraged t h e  search f o r  new cost-reduction measures 
by the  corporat ions and, a s  described in  the  memoirs of Iaccoca (1984), they  
were caught r e l a t i v e l y  unprepared by the  t r i p l i n g  of o i l  p r i c e s  in  1973 and 
by the  speed with which the  foreign automobile producers responded t o  the  
changed s i t u a t i o n  f o r  the  industry.  The automobiles of producers in Japan 
and Europe were smaller  and more f u e l - e f f i c i e n t  s o  t h e i r  a s s imi la t ion  
reduced t h e  market sha re  of U.S. companies and opened the  l a rge  U.S. 
domestic market t o  penet ra t ion  by fore ign i n t e r e s t s .  
Eventually the  U.S. automobile producers sought a s s i s t a n c e  from t h e i r  
government t o  block t h e  penet ra t ion  of the  U.S. market by r i v a l  fore ign 
producers. Imports from Japan came t o  be guided by 'voluntary '  quotas  -- an 
arrangement of s i g n i f i c a n t  benef i t  t o  producers i n  both coun t r i e s ,  pr imar i ly  
because of t h e i r  subsequent p r i c ing  decis ions .  Japanese manufacturers 
enjoyed a considerable c o s t  advantage f o r  a number of p e r s i s t e n t  reasons.  
According t o  Business Week (November 7 ,  1983)) these  producers 'p r iced  t h e i r  
c a r s  a t  l e a s t  as high as comparable U.S. b u i l t  models . . .  [so i f ]  t h e r e  were 
no r e s t r a i n t s ,  t he re  would be sharp competition between [sic] the Japanese 
companies, and they would be forced t o  reduce p r o f i t  margins. '  The U . S .  
producers used t h i s  modest form of protec t ion  t o  raise t h e i r  o m  p r i c e s  a t  
r a t e s  f a s t e r  than those f o r  the  growth of t h e i r  o m  c o s t s  and f o r  i n f l a t i o n  
in genera l .12  When the  U.S. producers attempted t o  develop t h e i r  own l i n e s  
of smaller  automobiles, they were unable t o  overcome the  cos t  advantage of 
about $1500-2000 per  vehic le  t h a t  was enjoyed by t h e i r  Japanese r i v a l s  s o  
they chose a novel course of ac t ion .  Instead of focusing on d i r e c t  
competition, the  U.S. producers augmented the  t a c i t  understanding on 
voluntary quotas with new s t r u c t u r a l  alignments in  which they exchanged 
sha res  with t h e i r  foreign r i v a l s  and set up a s e r i e s  of j o i n t  ventures .13  
These s t r u c t u r a l  alignments slowed t h e  dec l ine  i n  the  s t a t u s  of the  
U.S. automobile corporat ions.  However, they could not  h a l t  o r  reverse t h e  
long-term trend away from t h e  primacy of U.S. i n t e r e s t s .  Japanese 
manufacturers' sha re  of the  U.S. automobile market continued t o  advance-- 
the  l e v e l  of 6 per  cen t  in 1971 grew t o  about 25 per  cen t  in 1987. Given t h e  
pe r s i s t ence  of t h i s  adverse development, t h e  th ree  U.S. p r i n c i p a l s  s t a r t e d  
t o  d i v e r s i f y  t h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s  and, in p a r t i c u l a r ,  turned t o  production of 
armaments. Chrysler ,  a c t i v e  in m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  s ince  the  e a r l y  1970s, had 
become t h e  10th largest contrac tor  t o  the  Pentagon by 1981 but then t h e  
pressure  of f i n a n c i a l  entanglements and a cash shortage i n  1982 caused the  
corporat ion t o  s e l l  its very successful  tank-producing operat ion t o  General 
Dynamics. This ac t ion  was a severe setback t o  Chrys le r ' s  p lans  and, 
subsequent t o  the  corpora t ion ' s  achievement of renewed solvency, i t  sought 
new acqu i s i t ions  in  t h e  defence a r e a .  Purchase of Gulfstream Aerospace i n  
1986 permitted Chrysler t o  regain membership in the  Pentagon top-100 list of 
cont rac tors .  
The second-largest U.S. automobile producer, Ford, chose t o  develop its 
own l i n e  of high-technology items through the  Philco subs id ia ry ,  which 
gradually moved out  of consumer markets and was renamed as Ford Aerospace in  
1976. By t h i s  time, the corporat ion received $1.5  b i l l i o n  from annual s a l e s  
of products t o  defence and space customers. Ford purchased another defence 
con t rac to r ,  BDM In te rna t iona l ,  i n  1988 a f t e r  being outbid f o r  Hughes 
A i r c r a f t  by General Motors th ree  years  e a r l i e r .  The c o s t  t o  General Motors 
of Hughes Ai rc ra f t  was $5.2 b i l l i o n  and with its 1984 a c q u i s i t i o n ,  f o r  $2 .5  
b i l l i o n ,  of Elec t ronic  Data Systems, General Motors became the  5 th  l a r g e s t  
Pentagon con t rac to r .  A l l  t h ree  of the  p r i n c i p a l  U.S. automobile corpora t ions  
experienced modest increases f o r  the share  of m i l i t a r y  revenues in t h e i r  
t o t a l  s a l e s  a f t e r  t h e  mid-1970s. These s h a r e s  remains q u i t e  small ( f o r  
example, about 2 pe r  c e n t  f o r  both Chrys le r  and Ford, 5 p e r  c e n t  f o r  General 
Motors),  bu t  t h e i r  con t r ibu t ion  t o  p r o f i t s  was d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y  l a r g e r .  
The c i v i l i a n  a i r c r a f t  indus t ry  in  t he  United S t a t e s  has witnessed a 
s e r i e s  of concent ra t ion  cyc le s  du r ing  which t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  indus t ry  
w a s  mcdified.14 During t h e  1970s, t h e r e  w a s  a c o n f l i c t  over  wide-body 
a i r f rames  as t h e  DC-10 of McDonnell-Douglas and t h e  L-1011 of Lockheed 
chal lenged t h e  commercial success  of Boeing's 747 Jumbo-Jet. Following t h e  
f a i l u r e  of t h i s  cha l lenge ,  the  Lockheed corpora t ion  was seve re ly  weakened 
and l e f t  t h e  product ion of commercial j e t  a i r c r a f t .  The o t h e r  l o s e r ,  
McDonnell-Douglas, w a s  i n i t i a l l y  c r ea t ed  in 1967 when McDonnell absorbed 
Douglas as a means of d i v e r s i f y i n g  its a c t i v i t i e s  i n t o  t h i s  i ndus t ry  bu t  t h e  
Douglas Divis ion p e r s i s t e n t l y  f a i l e d  t o  make an adequate l e v e l  of ea rn ings .  
By 1983, t h e  accumulated l o s s e s  of t h e  d i v i s i o n  was about $500 m i l l i o n .  
Although 381 o r d e r s  were received f o r  t h e  DC-10, t h e  d i v i s i o n  continued t o  
make a d d i t i o n a l  l o s s e s  through 1987.15 
A second concent ra t ion  cyc le  was i n i t i a t e d  when t h e  hegemony of U.S. 
corpora t ions  i n  t h e  production of commercial j e t  a i r c r a f t  was chal lenged by 
t h e  c rea t ion  of an Airbus Consortium when aerospace companies based i n  
France,  West Germany, t h e  United Kingdom and Spain decided t o  c o l l a b o r a t e .  
The Airbus en tered  the  market f o r  wide-body a i r c r a f t  and soon gained a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  foothold with about 20 per  cen t  of t h e  worldwide s a l e s  by 1987. 
Thi s  i n t r u s i o n  l e f t  t h e  i ndus t ry  wi th  chronic  overcapac i ty .  According t o  one 
e s t ima te ,  t h e  annual j o i n t  product ion by Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas and t h e  
Airbus Consortium in  1987 was 700 a i r c r a f t ,  about 200 more than  could be 
r e a d i l y  absorbed by t h e  world market f o r  such a i r c r a f t ! l "  Fu r the r  
concent ra t ion  seems l i k e l y  s i n c e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  p e r s i s t  as an e s s e n t i a l  
p re l imina ry  f o r  any p a r t i a l  merger t o  l i n k  t h e  European i n t r u d e r  wi th  e i t h e r  
McDonnell-Douglas o r  Lockheed.17 S t r u c t u r a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  is a l s o  encouraged 
by t h e  shee r  magnitude of i nd iv idua l  o rde r  c o n t r a c t s ,  now involv ing  b i l l i o n s  
of U.S. d o l l a r s .  For example, i n  May 1988, t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Lease Finance 
Corporation s igned a d e a l  t o  buy 100 a i r c r a f t  from Boeing (worth about $3.7 
b i l l i o n )  and 30 a i r c r a f t  from t h e  Airbus Consortium (about  $1.3 b i l l i o n ) ,  
while ignoring McDonnell-Douglas comple t e ly . l e  
The f i r s t  c a s u a l t y  of concent ra t ion  was Lockheed when t h i s  corpora t ion  
r e t r e a t e d  i n t o  t h e  s e c u r i t y  b lanket  of m i l i t a r y  product ion .  Looking forward,  
t h e  next  c a s u a l t y  is l i k e l y  t o  be McDonnell-Douglas, which w a s  adverse ly  
weakened i n  the war of a t t r i t i o n  f o r  s a l e s  of c i v i l i a n  a i r c r a f t  a l though i t  
remains s o l v e n t .  Chairman and ch ief  execut ive  o f f i c e r  of t h e  co rpo ra t ion ,  
John McDonnell, has  acknowledged t h e  need t o  keep c l o s e  t o  defence  
c o n t r a c t i n g  because of poor performance in its non-mi l i ta ry  a c t i v i t i e s .  
Boeing remains t h e  undisputed indus t ry  leader  b u t  t h e  agg res s ive  p r i c e  
p o l i c i e s  of t h e  European consortium have caused Boeing t o  reduces its own 
p r i c e s  and thus  t o  experience a slump i n  ea rn ings .  On t h e  p o l i t i c a l  f r o n t ,  
Boeing p o i n t s  t o  t h e  s u b s i d i e s  provided by European governments t o  t h e  
Airbus Consortium (amounting t o  $14 b i l l i o n  s i n c e  1970) as ' u n f a i r ' ;  while  
ignor ing  t h e  c ross -subs id iza t ion  of ea rn ings  from s a l e s  t o  t h e  U.S. m i l i t a r y  
es tab l i shment .  I n  1984, t h e  m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  of Boeing accounted f o r  40 p e r  
c e n t  of its revenue and 80 per  c e n t  of its n e t  income s o  t h e  supremacy of 
t h e  corpora t ion  in product ion of c i v i l i a n  a i r c r a f t  s tems,  i n  part,  from an 
i n d i r e c t  m i l i t a r y  subs idy .  lQ 
Our f i n a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n  focuses  on t h e  r ecen t  exper iences  of General  
E l e c t r i c  as it s h i f t e d  from t h e  a r e a  of consumer e l e c t r o n i c s  toward a deeper  
involvement i n  government-related a c t i v i t y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  toward t h e  
product ion of armaments and medical equipment. I n  1985, a merger brought 
General E l e c t r i c  and RCA toge the r  f o r  t h e  sum of $6 .3  mi l l i on  -- r e u n i t i n g  
two co rpora t ions  t h a t  had been separa ted  as an a n t i - t r u s t  measure i n  t h e  
1930s.20 The two r i v a l s  had competed f o r  s a l e s  of consumer e l e c t r o n i c  
products  and f o r  m i l i t a r y  s a l e s .  Th i s  a c q u i s i t i o n  of RCA was conceived by 
General E l e c t r i c  as p a r t  of a wider s t r a t e g y  t o  s t r eng then  t h e  company as it 
became one of t h e  l a r g e s t  U.S. producers  in t h e  a rmment ,  aerospace and 
atomic i n d u s t r i e s .  During t h e  per iod  1981-7, while  J ack  Welch was its 
chairman, General E l e c t r i c  s o l d  some 232 bus iness  and product  l i n e s  while  
buying 338 o t h e r s . 2 1  Such h e c t i c  r e s t r u c t u r i n g ,  a t  a average r a t e  of one 
t r a n s a c t i o n  a week, stemmed from Welch's ove r t  ' d i s l i k e  f o r  markets 
dominated by Japan ' s  e l e c t r o n i c  f i r m s . ' 2 2  Th i s  p roces s  cont inued through 
1987 when General E l e c t r i c  made a 'swap' arrangement wi th  Thornson SA of 
France,  by which GE gave up its consumer-electronic d i v i s i o n  (worth about  
$3.2 b i l l i o n )  f o r  a medical-equipment u n i t  (worth $770 m i l l i o n )  and $800 
mi l l i on  in  cash from t h e  French company -- an apparent  l o s s  of $1 .6  b i l l i o n !  
The o v e r a l l  purpose of t h e s e  a c t i o n s  was t o  achieve  a conso l ida t ion  of  
General E l e c t r i c ' s  s t a k e  i n  government-related markets and f i n a n c e .  S ince  
t h e  e a r l y  1980s, i n  a p a r a l l e l  adjustment ,  General E l e c t r i c  F i n a n c i a l  
Se rv i ces  ceased t o  be p r imar i ly  involved wi th  t h e  f inanc ing  of app l i ance  
s a l e s  and became a d i v e r s i f i e d  f i n a n c i a l  g i a n t  wi th  assets of $50 b i l l i o n  
and n e t  income i n  excess  of $1 b i l l i o n  ( b u t  wi th  only a small po r t ion  of its 
o p e r a t i o n s  now being consumer-oriented).23 
The r e l a t i v e  s h i f t  of major U.S. co rpo ra t ions  toward m i l i t a r y  b u s i n e s s ,  
which is e f f e c t i v e l y  s h e l t e r e d  from t h e  p re s su res  of fore ign  compe t i t i on ,  
and away from c i v i l i a n  bus iness  is easy t o  connect wi th  g a i n s  i n  
prof  i t a b i l i t y  . When some m i l i t a r y  c o n t r a c t o r s  sought t o  d i v e r s i f y  i n  t h e  
oppos i te  d i r e c t i o n ,  t hey  g e n e r a l l y  experienced seve re  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  An 
appropr i a t e  i l l u s t r a t i o n  is provided by the  attempt of Grumman t o  r a i s e  t h e  
e x t e n t  of its c i v i l i a n  ope ra t ions  s o  they  were 50 pe r  c e n t  of t h e  o v e r a l l  
s a l e s .  Grumman entered  i n t o  t h e  product ion of sh ipping  c o n t a i n e r s ,  
waste-treatment p l a n t s ,  buses,  automobile p a r t s  and computer s e r v i c e s  b u t  
t h e s e  i n i t i a t i v e s  u s u a l l y  r e su l t ed  i n  l o s s e s  and t h e  eventua l  r e s e l l i n g  of 
t h e i r  production f a c i l i t i e s .  Curren t ly ,  t he  non-defence ope ra t ions  of 
Grumman c o n s t i t u t e  about 10 pe r  c e n t  of s a l e s  and t h e  ' t h e  50 pe r  c e n t  
program' is e s s e n t i a l l y  d iscarded .24  The s t a t e  of t h e  company is similar t o  
t h a t  p r e v a i l i n g  in  t h e  e a r l y  1970s. 
Other  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of t h e  f a i l u r e  by a defence  c o n t r a c t o r  t o  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  d i v e r s i f y  i n t o  c i v i l i a n  product ion are provided by t h e  r e c e n t  
conduct of Rockwell I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and General Dynamics. In  1985, t he  former 
acquired Allen Bradley,  a producer of automated f a c t o r i e s ,  f o r  $1.65 
b i l l i o n .  Th i s  new a c t i v i t y  was a d r a i n  on ea rn ings  and t h e  company q u i c k l y  
resumed t h e  sea rch  f o r  f u r t h e r  a c q u i s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  defence  indus t ry .  General 
Dynamics had its own 50 pe r  cen t  programme f o r  c i v i l i a n  s a l e s  i n  t he  1970s 
b u t  t h e  corpora t ion  abandoned t h e  at tempt  t o  d i v e r s i f y  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n  
du r ing  t h e  e a r l y  1980s. Most of its non-defence ope ra t ions  were s o l d  s o  t h a t  
military product ion now accounts  f o r  over 90 pe r  cen t  of t h e  company's 
s a l e s .  25 
The s h a r e  of m i l i t a r y  s a l e s  i n  t o t a l  s a l e s  f r equen t ly  u n d e r s t a t e s  t h e  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  of such government-related product ion f o r  U.S. co rpo ra t ions .  We 
have a l r eady  noted how t h e  y i e l d  of m i l i t a r y  product ion provided 80 pe r  c e n t  
of Boeing's p r o f i t s  in 1984 bu t  on ly  40 pe r  cen t  of its sales. S c a t t e r e d  
evidence sugges t s  t h a t  similar d i s p a r i t i e s  a r e  a common experience f o r  o t h e r  
Defense c o n t r a c t o r s .  Thus it is tempting t o  conclude t h e  growing ' m i l i t a r y  
b i a s ' ,  t h a t  we have descr ibed  here a t  some length ,  r e f l e c t s  acu te  awareness 
of t h e  favourable  p r o f i t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  t o  be found i n  m i l i t a r y  a c t i v i t i e s .  
When t h e  House Appropriat ions Committee considered t h e  d e s i r a b i l i t y  of 
h a l t i n g  t h e  F-18 programme, t h e r e  emerged the  f a c t  t h a t  s a l e s  of m i l i t a r y  
a i r c r a f t  generated ha l f  t h e  revenue of McDonnell-Douglas and a l l  of t h e  
company's p r o f i t s .  An a u d i t  of some 8,000 c o n t r a c t s  between t h e  Pentagon and 
General E l e c t r i c  ( i n  e f f e c t  du r ing  t h e  period between 1978 and 1983) 
revealed a r a t e  of p r o f i t  of about 25 per  cen t  -- a l e v e l  t h a t  was 10 pe r  
c e n t  higher  than t h e  r e f e r e n t i a l  o r  ' a n t i c i p a t e d '  r a t e ;  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  h igher  
than t h e  corresponding average r e t u r n  f o r  GE's commercial b u s i n e s s . 2 s  
A major f a c t o r  i n  t h e  explanat ion of d i f f e r e n t i a l s  is t h e  p r a c t i c e  of 
charging t h e  Pentagon f o r  ' cost-overruns ' , which is r a r e l y  matched i n  
c i v i l i a n  opera t ions .27  A secondary advantage of t h e  commitment t o  m i l i t a r y  
product ion is one of earn ings  s t a b i l i t y .  Often t h e  y i e l d  from Defense 
c o n t r a c t s  can make the  d i f f e r e n c e  between an aggregate  p r o f i t  and l o s s  f o r  a 
corpora t ion  f ac ing  a d i f f i c u l t  economic s i t u a t i o n .  In  t h e  t h i r d  q u a r t e r  of 
1986, f o r  example, General Motors struggled wi th  an inventory  g l u t  and 
ope ra t ing  l o s s e s  of $339 m i l l i o n .  Workers were f i r e d  and p l a n t s  c losed b u t  
t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o f i t  s i t u a t i o n  of t h e  corpora t ion  w a s  saved by t h e  m i l i t a r y  
s a l e s  of Hughes A i r c r a f t  and E l e c t r o n i c  Data Systems as  well a s  by t h e  
f i n a n c i a l  a c t i v i t i e s  of GM Acceptance.28 
Although governmental a u d i t s  ( such  as t h a t  by t h e  U.S. Comptroller 
General i n  1971) f r equen t ly  confirm the  p r o f i t  d i f f e r e n t i a l  f o r  
government-related bus ines s ,  assessments  of its ex ten t  a r e  confused by t h e  
conglomerate c h a r a c t e r  of most armament producers .  C i v i l i a n  and m i l i t a r y  
a c t i v i t i e s  are bound toge the r  by both technologica l  and f i n a n c i a l  sou rces  of 
interdependency, which cannot be r e a d i l y  s epa ra t ed .  J u s t  as t h e  revenue from 
GM Acceptance c ross-subs id izes  t h e  c a r  s a l e s  of t h e  p a r e n t  GM co rpora t ion ,  
s o  too  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  in f luence  of General Motors as t h e  l a r g e s t  employer i n  
t he  United S t a t e s  can a f f e c t  t h e  a b i l i t y  of another  s u b s i d i a r y ,  Hughes 
A i r c r a f t ,  t o  ob ta in  a  c o n t r a c t  f o r  s a t e l l i t e  c o n s t r u c t i o n .  
The p r e c i s e  impact of m i l i t a r y  bus ines s  on t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o f i t  p i c t u r e  
f o r  major U.S. co rpo ra t ions  cannot be determined b u t  some q u a l i t a t i v e  
conclus ions  a r e  c l e a r l y  supported by t h e  evidence t h a t  e x i s t s  in t h e  p u b l i c  
domain. A major f e a t u r e  of t h e  changing economic environment i n  t h e  last two 
decades is t h e  inc reas ing  l e v e l  of dependency of many l a r g e  co rpo ra t ions  on 
t h e  suppor t  from t h e i r  government and, e s p e c i a l l y ,  from its spending on 
defence .  Th i s  ' m i l i t a r y  b i a s '  of a c t i v i t y  has r e c e n t l y  been e f f e c t i v e l y  
augmented by a concomitant form of ' f i n a n c i a l  b i a s '  with t h e  emergence of  
l a r g e  budgetary d e f i c i t s  a f t e r  t h e  late 1970s. The Defense Budget is l a r g e l y  
f inanced through borrowing s o  t h e  government bond market has  become a major 
' o f f s e t  t o  s av ings '  in its own r i g h t  -- gene ra t ing  $200 b i l l i o n  of new 
investment o p p o r t u n i t i e s  i n  1988 a lone .  A s  is w e l l  known, t h e  l e v e l  of t h e  
U.S. f e d e r a l  d e b t  grew t o  $1 t r i l l i o n  by 1981 a f t e r  more than two c e n t u r i e s  
of government borrowing bu t  then doubled wi th in  t h e  next  f i v e  yea r s !  
I n e v i t a b l y ,  t h i s  dramat ic  development has  i n t e n s i f i e d  t h e  t ransformation of 
t h e  ' b i g  economy' i n  t h e  United S t a t e s ,  wi th  f i n a n c i a l  i n t e r e s t s  r ep l ac ing  
product ive  ones.29 
Whether t h e  presence of t hese  m i l i t a r y  and f i n a n c i a l  b i a s e s ,  a s soc i a t ed  
wi th  what Gold (1977) and o t h e r s  term 'Military Keynesianism', con t r ibu ted  
t o  an o v e r a l l  expansion o r  con t r ac t ion  of t h e  U.S. economy is a complex 
i s s u e  t h a t  needs t o  be addressed.  We a r e  s u r e  t h a t  t h e  causes of t h e  b i a s e s  
have an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  cha rac t e r  and cannot ,  themselves,  be s o l e l y  a t t r i b u t e d  
t o  the  p re s su re  from s t agna t iona ry  tendencies  a r i s i n g  in  t h e  domestic U.S. 
economy. Thus, t o  be v a l i d  f o r  the  present  s i t u a t i o n ,  t h e  f a m i l i a r  
commentaries from both neo-Marxist and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  perspect ives  [which a r e  
b r i e f l y  i d e n t i f i e d  in Bichler ,  Nitzan and Rowley (1989)l must be 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  revised  t o  acknowledge the  new i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e a l i t i e s .  On the  
o the r  hand, much a t t e n t i o n  must be given t o  developments i n  the  big economy 
of t h e  United S t a t e s  f o r  they a r e  t h e  pulse  of t h e  world economy. The 
d e c l i n e  of U.S.-based corporat ions in domestic and fore ign c i v i l i a n  markets 
was both a s t imulus and a p a r t i a l  consequence t o  t h e i r  involvement with t h e  
b e t t e r  investment oppor tuni t ies  t o  be found in  armament, space and f i n a n c i a l  
areas of a c t i v i t y .  Thus the  emergence of the  armament core  and t h e  ' d e c l i n e '  
of the  United S t a t e s  should be perceived a s  j o i n t  f e a t u r e s  of an 
i n t e r a c t i v e ,  double-edged process of changing fo r tunes .  A f i n a l  aspect  of 
t h i s  process involves the  choice of arms expor ts  t o  overcome a weakening in 
the  ef fec t iveness  of t h e  U.S. government t o  assist l a rge  U.S.-based 
mult inat ional  corporat ions by its own m i l i t a r y  spending.30 
Notes 
1. The ' b i g  economy' concept is explained and i l l u s t r a t e d  in  Rowley, 
Bichler  and Nitzan (1988) by reference  t o  aggregate concentrat ion i n  t h e  
Israeli economy. 
2 .  Kalecki 's d i s t i n c t i o n  is repeated i n  Bichler ,  Nitzan and Rowley (1989) 
a s  a p o t e n t i a l  backdrop f o r  a competitive s t rugg le  between r i v a l  business 
f a c t i o n s  i n  t h e  economic and p o l i t i c a l  e l i t e  of t h e  United S t a t e s .  
3. USX, E.I. Du Pont de  Nemours, Dow Chemicals, Union Carbide and Alcoa, 
f o r  example, are major supp l i e r s  t o  prime Defense con t rac to r s .  However, 
these  corporat ions do not  of ten  appear on t h e  annual list of 100 Defense 
con t rac to r s  s i n c e  t h e i r  products a r e  not  d i r e c t l y  so ld  t o  the  Pentagon. Note 
too the  largest prime con t rac to r s  are a l s o  the  l a r g e s t  subcontrac tors .  
4 .  Other f i rms (such as L i t t o n ,  LTV, Northrop, Tennaco, and Textron) 
entered t h e  top-10 list only occasionally during the  two decades from 1966 
t o  1986. The parent  company f o r  Hughes Ai rc ra f t  p r i o r  t o  t h e  GM purchase w a s  
Hughes Medical I n s t i t u t e .  Since the  l a t t e r  w a s  a p r i v a t e  company which d i d  
not  r e l e a s e  f i n a n c i a l  r epor t s ,  it cannot be included in our ind ices .  
5. Fortune considers  a corporat ion t o  be ' i n d u s t r i a l '  i f  at l e a s t  ha l f  of 
its s a l e s  revenue comes from manufacturing o r  mining a c t i v i t i e s .  
6 .  The dec l ine  of the  r a t i o  in  1986 is s i g n i f i c a n t  in view of t h e  
p e r s i s t e n t  e a r l i e r  t rend.  We d i scuss  the  dec l ine  elsewhere. 
7 .  While membership of the  armament nine is f ixed ,  t h e  composition of the  
Fortune-500 list v a r i e s  each year .  However, changes occur pr imar i ly  a t  t h e  
bottom of t h i s  list s o  the  impact of the  changing population does not  have a 
marked e f f e c t  on t h e  r a t i o .  Clear ly  mergers and acqu i s i t ions  a f f e c t  both 
denominator and numerator of our f igures .  The r a t i o  was ca lcu la ted  from 
information on n e t  income of the  corporat ions as reported t o  t h e i r  
shareholders.  This  information assesses  income t ax  ob l iga t ions  according t o  
s t a t u t o r y  r a t e s .  In  p r a c t i c e ,  a c t u a l  t axes  a r e  of ten  much lower (and thus  
a c t u a l  n e t  income much higher)  than these  r epor t s  suggest  because of 
deductions,  exemptions and c r e d i t s  t h a t  a r e  included in the  U.S. t a x  code. 
Such add i t iona l  provisions a r e  e spec ia l ly  generous t o  the  major Defense 
con t rac to r s ,  who can de fe r  t a x  payments u n t i l  c o n t r a c t s  a r e  completed and 
can avoid payment a l toge the r  through the  ' ne t  opera t ing  losses  carryforward' 
scheme. Wildstorm (1985, p .  96) i l l u s t r a t e s  t h i s  f l e x i b i l i t y  by reference t o  
General Dynamics during the  period from 1975 t o  1984. This  company recorded 
opera t ing  p r o f i t s  t o  its shareholders in 9 out  of these  10 years  but paid no 
fede ra l  income t a x  because it could c a r r y  forward losses!  Given t h i s  
backdrop, it is poss ib le  t h a t  our f i g u r e s  unders ta te  the  r e l a t i v e  growth of 
the  armament core because of d i f f e r e n t i a l  t ax  advantages. 
8 .  Intermediate f i g u r e s  f o r  t h i s  second r a t i o  a r e  1.1 per cent  in  1975, 
2 . 0  per  cent  in  1980 and 3 .6  per cent  in  1982. These IRS d a t a  a r e  derived 
from t a b l e s  prepared by the  U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis--The National 
Income and P r a i u c t  Accounts of the  United S t a t e s .  1929-82. S t a t i s t i c a l  
Tables (1986, pp. 402-4, Table 8.13,  l i n e s  1 and 19) and the  U.S. Bureau of 
t h e  Census--Sta t i s t ica l  Abstract  o f  the  United S ta tes :  1988 (1987, p .  512, 
Table 872). 
9 .  The jump i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  sha re  of Japan, West Germany and France in 
world expor ts  f o r  1986 r e f l e c t s  t h e  impact of f a l l i n g  o i l  p r i c e s  and o i l  
revenues. 
10. Note t h a t  t h e  r a t i o  between foreign and domestic earnings is a l s o  
a f fec ted  by changes in the  exchange r a t e s  used t o  convert fore ign p r o f i t  
f i g u r e s  i n t o  U.S. equivalents .  
11. See U.S. Bureau of t h e  Census, S t a t i s t i c a l  Abst rac t  of  the  United 
S t a t e s :  1988 (108th e d i t i o n ) ,  p .  758, Table 1330 and p .  759, Table 1332. 
12. The quota agreement was s o  ' successful '  t h a t  Japanese producers 
continued t o  r e s t r a i n  automobile exports  t o  the  United S t a t e s  a f t e r  the  
agreement ended in  1985. See 'Why Carmakers Will Mourn i f  Export Quota Die '  
i n  Business Week (February 18, 1985, p .  46) and 'U,S. Car Quotas: How Less 
is More f o r  Japan' in  Rusiness Week (November 7, 1983, pp. 61-2). The 
adverse consequences f o r  consumers r e l a t i v e  t o  the advantages t o  producers, 
domestic and fore ign,  were proclaimed as ' A  Misstep by t h e  Auto Makers' by 
Business Week (January 19, 1985) . 
13. J o i n t  ventures linked General Motors with Toyota, Ford with Mazda, and 
Chrysler with Mitsubishi .  
14. A s  commonly found in economics, the  term ' cyc le '  is used without 
implying pe r iod ic i ty .  
15. See ' A  Dogfight could Nick t h e  F-18' in  Rusiness Week (February 14, 
1983, pp. 64 f f . )  and 'Tower t o  McDonnell: Turbulence Ahead' by James E .  
E l l i s  i n  Business Week (May 23, 1988, pp. 117-8). 
16. See 'Boeing B a t t l e s  t o  Stay on Top' by Kenneth Labich in Fortuie 
(September 28, 1987, pp. 64 f f . ) .  
17. See 'Is Airbus Taking McDonnell Douglas f o r  a Ride?' by John Rossand 
and Chuck Hawkins i n  Business Week (March 21, 1988, p .  51) .  
18. See ' A  Bundle of Boeings' in Ti111e (May 30, 1988). 
19. See 'The Mil i ta ry  Buildup a t  Boeing' in Business Meek (March 11, 1985). 
20. RCA began l i f e  in 1919 a s  a majority-owned subs id iary  of General 
E l e c t r i c  with the  d i r e c t  encouragement of the  Assistant Secre tary  of t h e  
Navy, Franklin Roosevelt. 
21. See 'General E l e c t r i c  is Sta lk ing Big Game Again' in B ~ ~ s i n e s s  Week 
(March 16, 1987). 
22. See 'Jumping Jack S t r i k e s  Again' i n  Time (August 3 ,  1987). Welch's own 
account f o r  how t h e  GE-RCA merger was conceived supports  t h i s  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The decis ion  t o  spend $6.3 b i l l i o n  on RCA came a f t e r  a s h o r t  
meeting between the  two companies' chairmen in which they ta lked about 
defence business and the  tough Japanese competition in  consumer e l e c t r o n i c s .  
Welch discovered t h a t  he and h i s  counterpart  thought almost a l i k e  and noted 
t h a t  'when you meet people with the  same philosophical  bent and you both s e e  
g lobal  markets and you can both agree,  you move.' See ' A  Reunion of 
Technological T i t a n s '  i n  Time (December 23, 1985, p .  5 0 ) .  
23. See 'Why GE's Financia l  Powerhouse i s n ' t  E l e c t r i f y i n g  Wall S t r e e t "  in 
Business Week (October 31, 1988, pp. 142-3). 
24. See 'Grumman: Beating a S t r a t e g i c  Retreat  t o  t h e  Defense Business '  i n  
Biwiness Week (November 14, 1983, pp . 210-1) . 
25. For the  background on the  a c t i v i t i e s  of these  two companies, s e e  
'Rockwell Can' t  Replace t h e  B-18 . . .  O r  Can I t ? '  i n  Business lu'eek (February 
29, 1988, pp. 46-7) and 'General Dynamics Under F i r e '  in  Business Week 
(March 25, 1985, p .  72) .  
26. See 'Cracking Down on Contractors '  i n  Time (Apr i l  8 ,  1985). 
27. When Grumman had a f ixed-price cont rac t  f o r  the  F-14 a i r c r a f t ,  then its 
primary product,  t h e  corporation l o s t  $255 mil l ion on t h e  a i r c r a f t  in 1974 
and its subsequent recovery can be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  the  s a l e  of 80 a i r c r a f t  t o  
I r a n .  However f ixed-price con t rac t s  a r e  exceptional  and more f l e x i b i l i t y  
genera l ly  p r e v a i l s .  Consider, f o r  example, the  bid by General Dynamics t o  
produce the  SSN-688 nuclear  submarine a t  a u n i t  p r i c e  of $61 mi l l ion .  By 
1976, the  p r i c e  has been ra ised  t o  $107 mi l l ion  due t o  ' a n t i c i p a t e d '  f u t u r e  
c o s t  overruns! Note t h i s  adjustment occurred before t h e  c o s t  overruns were 
a c t u a l l y  incurred.  See 'GD Under F i r e '  in Time (Apr i l  8,  1985) f o r  more 
information on t h i s  sweetener. Other examples of p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  include the  
Air Defense Gun of the  Ford Aerospace Division ( t h e  u n i t  c o s t  of which grew 
from $4.2 mi l l ion  t o  $7.2 mi l l ion) ,  t h e  Advanced Combat System of IBM 
( r i s i n g  from $2.4 b i l l i o n  t o  $3.3 b i l l i o n ) ,  and the  Advanced Medium Range 
Air-to-Air Missi le  of Hughes Ai rc ra f t  ( r i s i n g  from $125,000 t o  $400,000 per  
u n i t ) .  See 'Forget the  $400 Hammers: Here 's  Where the  Big Money is Lost '  by 
Jonathan Tas in i  et al. i n  Business Week ( Ju ly  8 ,  1985, pp. 48-50). 
28. See 'GM's B i g  Operating Loss' i n  Business Week (November 3 ,  1986, p .  
36). 
29. An i n t e r e s t i n g  account of the  f i n a n c i a l  dimension is provided by 'Will 
Money Managers Wreck the Economy? ' in Business Week (August 13, 3.984, pp. 86 
f f . ) .  The holding d i s t r i b u t i o n  f o r  the  U.S. Federal Debt is not  pub l i c ly  
ava i l ab le  but a reasonable assumption is t h a t  much is owed t o  la rge  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  inves tors  of t h e  b ig  economy (both domestic and f o r e i g n ) .  
30. The e r a  of arms exports  is considered in  Rowley, Bichler  and Nitzan 
(1989). 
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